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Estimating Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Simulation

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: wlahneman{at}towson.edu.

	Abstract

The simulation offers a way to improve student understanding of the analytic process used by intelligence analysts as well as analysts in other fields such as business and public policy. The simulation places participants in the role of intelligence analysts in the months leading up to the Iraq War. Participants prepare an outline of a national intelligence estimate (NIE) that assesses the status of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The simulation has several stages that mimic the actual process that the U.S. intelligence community (IC) uses to produce NIEs. The simulation gives participants a better understanding of the ambiguity that IC analysts face in their jobs, the difficult assessments they must make based on limited information, the complexities of collaboration between different agencies in the IC to produce unified judgments, and the different perspectives of analysts and policy makers. The simulation takes about 2 hours to conduct and requires very little preparation by instructors and participants. It is a valuable addition to courses in intelligence, national security, foreign policy, and international relations.

First published on July 30, 2009
Simulation & Gaming 2009, doi:10.1177/1046878109341395


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